**Forum Response 1 History of Peacekeeping 1988-present 150 words or more with works cited:**

   The responsibility to protect is defined in the ICISS’s report as “…the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states” (ICISS 2001, VIII). This definition implies the responsibility of the international community to intervene when the protection of civilians is not guaranteed by the state in question. Though this clearly infringes on traditional rules of sovereignty and perhaps opposes the idea of intervention by consent, it adds potency to the efforts of International Organizations in conflict resolution. Furthermore, if predicated on the belief that “state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies in with the state itself” then a state unable to fulfill this responsibility subsequently abdicates some or all of their sovereignty (ICISS 2001, XI).

     What then are the potential impacts of adopting the responsibility to protect? In the case of El Salvador, where the eventual involvement of the UN is largely deemed a success, it came after years of civil war with countless atrocities committed by both sides. In Montgomery’s report on the success of UN intervention, he highlights that not only was this success one of the first civil wars the UN intervened in, but it was also one of the first where the UN inserted peacekeepers prior to a formal cease-fire (Montgomery 1995, 2 and 12). However, Montgomery concludes that the success of this effort was largely due to the buy-in of the Salvadorans themselves (Montgomery 1995, 15). It seems logical then that if the international community, through the UN, had acted prior to this state of Salvador “ripeness” they could have perhaps prevented many of the human rights violations, but in turn threatened the chances of a lasting peace by preventing the natural course of conflict resolution and “ripeness.”

     In relating the responsibility to protect to the conflict within Cambodia, it seems apparent that “ripeness” also played a role in the relative success of UN efforts. Some of this transition can be attributed to the reduction in interest by the opposing forces of Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union (Brown, 1992, 88). This point is critical in that it highlights, yet again, the role external forces play in solving, or exacerbating, conflicts. It is possible that if the UN had sought to intervene during the throws of external, interest-based involvement, that their efforts would have created a greater power struggle, created claims of sovereignty infringement, and subsequently damaged the reputation of the UN for being neutral in power struggles.

    While it seems that the international community and perhaps El Salvador and Cambodia themselves would not have reacted positively to UN intervention based on the responsibility to protect, there may be instances where this theory is useful and in some cases necessary. In other words, there are perhaps some instances where the cost of lasting peace by early intervention, is better than years of atrocities against humanity. It would seem that though the international environment was not open to this idea during the conflicts in El Salvador and Cambodia, times have changed and so to have the ideas associated to intervention on the premise of the responsibility to protect which logically includes the use of force (UN 2004, 18, 32-33, 53, 56) (UN 2005, 34-35).

     The ever-changing international environment is full of surprises. However, a steady variable is that of interest-based politics. The international community is not immune to this natural tendency, and subsequently any action based on the responsibility to protect will be faced with criticism. From those demanding more and those demanding less. Ultimately, as the globalized world grows ever closer we can hope that the interests of each state grow so interdependent that they normalize their opinions of right and wrong, and unite their efforts against the unspeakable atrocities targeted by the responsibility to protect.

Brown, Frederick Z. 1992. "Cambodia in 1991: An Uncertain Peace." Asian Survey 32, no. 1: 88-96. doi:10.2307/2645203. (Accessed 1 October 2018).

Montgomery, T. S. 1995. Getting to peace in el salvador: The roles of the united nations secretariat and ONUSAL. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 37(4), 139. Retrieved from <https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/200217211?accountid=8289>. (Accessed 1 October 2018).

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. 2001. “The Responsibility to Protect.” International Development and Research Centre. <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>. (Accessed 1 October 2018).

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The United Nations. 2005. “In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all.” Session 59. Items 45 and 55. <http://undocs.org/A/59/2005>. (Accessed 1 October 2018).

**Forum Response 2 History of Peacekeeping 1988-present 150 words or more with works cited:**

From a retrospective and hypothetical hindsight viewpoint, even if the International System was empowered with R2P to justify humanitarian intervention in either the El Salvador (1980-92) or Cambodia (1975-79) intra-State conflicts, it would not have changed the static posture that the International System took.  Further it could be argued that even if intervention was taken, it would not have changed the eventual outcome or nature of the Peacekeeping Operation which subsequently followed.  This is for several reasons, most importantly the bi-polar structure of the International System in this period being examined and is apparent by the inaction with the conflict in Syria and the lessons learned from the Libyan application.

With the humanitarian situation in Kosovo in 1999 deteriorating and international outcry, NATO executed a mission of military interdiction.  This was in clear violation of then Serbia’s sovereignty and in advance of any UN legislation authorizing any action, but justified and prevented a repeat of the Balkans tragedies.  In response to address the International Systems’ lack of a legislative tool which could be applied in order to prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in the 1990’s the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was drafted in 2000 and adopted by the UN in 2005.  The UN in essence was declaring it had the collective responsibility on behalf of the International System and as legal to authorize  measures to protect human rights, even if it ignored State sovereignty when if the State was not protecting its populace.  R2P would only be exercised after all other diplomatic channels have been exhausted and intervention in a State without the State’s consent was authorized, when the State was committing or allowing mass atrocities to occur, or is committing them, in which case the State is no longer upholding its responsibilities as a sovereign. R2P principles it is argued helps to reinforce Sovereignty by helping States to recognize that they need to meet their existing responsibilities (Para 138 & 139 A/RES/60/1).

With regards to humanitarian violation taking place during the Cambodia (1975-79) conflict it was in the post-Viet Nam conflict period, when there was no appetite in by many Western States to intervene in Cambodia.  Further, introduction under R2P measures would not have set the conditions for a more successful execution of UN Peacekeeping Operations in either State.  It could be argued with the ending of the Cold War, support for both of these proxy conflicts dwindled and forced each side negotiate. Even armed with R2P legislation the Cold War power structure would have prevented the UNSC to authorize any intervention as both the Russians and Chinese would have vetoed any action taken against the violating government of the Khmer Rouge whose leftist position they were supporting.  In post conflict Cambodia UNTAC supervised, monitored, and verified the withdrawal of foreign forces and was responsible for locating and marking all minefields, deploy mine-clearing teams, conduct a mass public mine-awareness program, and train Cambodians in ordnance disposal a product of inter-State fighting with Vietnam (Brown, 1992. 92).  Similar to the El Salvador (1980-29) situation, in which the US would also veto any UNSC action because they were supporting a rightest government who was committing these atrocities against leftist elements.  However, the ONUSAL mission may have benefitted from having some institutional structure already established prior execution of this Peacekeeping Operation (Montgomery, 1992. 4).

Ironically when R2P was initiated it was around the re-emergence of Russia post Kosovo and the beginning of the posturing of China.  As mentioned the UNSC controls the execution of resolutions invoking R2P.  As seen with any military intervention in the Syrian Civil War, both Russia and China have vetoed citing R2P in the aftermath of Libya as being abused to advance the Western agenda and not effective.

v-r Sepp Rodgers

Brown, Frederick Z. 1992. "Cambodia in 1991: An Uncertain Peace." Asian Survey 32, no. 1 (1992): 88-96. doi:10.2307/2645203.

Montgomery, T. S. 1995. Getting to peace in el salvador: The roles of the united nations secretariat and ONUSAL. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 37(4), 139.

Primary Documents on Responsibility to Protect (R2P):

- 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty on The Responsibility to Protect

- 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, A/RES/60/1, paragraphs 138-140